![]() Sometimes French sloth was measured in hours (the failure to occupy and defend a critical bridge over the Semois River) and sometimes in days (the failure to mount a timely counter attack against the German Sedan bridgehead). France, however, was led by sclerotic political and military leaders, often lacked the desire to fight and was almost always tardy in its actions. Germany was unprepared for anything more than a very short war and chose a strategy (thrusting through the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes, crossing the Meuse, and driving to the Atlantic Coast) that could have been frustrated in a half-dozen ways by the Western Allies, especially France. They appeal primarily to specialists who continue to dissect these campaigns, both of which are classics in the realm of conventional land warfare.įrieser argues persuasively that Germany took several huge risks by attacking France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (the Western Allies) on May 10, 1940. Even so, neither is likely to have much effect on how these battles are written about in the historical surveys that college students and others read. ![]() Further, both authors look at these campaigns a bit differently than previous researchers and prod us to reformulate our understanding of critical aspects of these battles. ![]() Both provide new data, or at least bring together in one book data that have been dispersed over many locations. Hence, when new ones appear, it is legitimate to ask, do they really provide new information, insights or interpretations? Both Frieser's look at the astonishing six-week 1940 German campaign in the West that drove France out of the war and Mawdsley's examination of the titanic 1941-45 German/Soviet battle on the Eastern front meet that test. The world does not lack for military histories of World War II, general or specific.
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